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I INTRODUCTION 
In two distinct periods of New Zealand's history calls for the development of a 
separate Maori legislative body have peaked. The justification for such a body 
in both periods was predominantly to incorporate the Treaty of W aitangi into 
New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. Despite this, recent discussion 
have focused only on incorporating the Treaty into our constitutional 
arrangements through an entrenched Constitution Act or Bill of Rights Act. 
There has been near silence on the possibility of altering our constitutional 
institutions as a way of incorporating the Treaty into our constitution, for 
example through the development of a separate Maori legislative body. 
This essay is a challenge to encourage people to consider the idea of a Maori 
legislative body as one way of incorporating the Treaty into our constitution. 
The first part of the essay lays the basis for this challenge. It outlines the 
significance of the Treaty, our constitutional institutions, past proposals for a 
Maori legislative body and the low level of comment and debate on the idea up 
until now. The second part proposes a series of factors which, it is argued, 
have contributed to the idea of a Maori legislative body failing to attract much 
comment or debate. The third part looks to the future. It examines how 
developing a Maori legislative body might become an issue in the future. Also, 
a direction is suggested for the sort of Maori legislative body we should 
perhaps be considering, its jurisdiction and the relationships it should have 
with the existing national Parliament and the Crown . 
Although this essay focuses on ideas of developing a Maori legislative body its 
findings on the lack of consideration in New Zealand of our constitutional 
institutions have wider significance. 
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II THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
The Treaty of W aitangi marked the beginning of constitutional government in 
New Zealand. 1 Successive governments, the Waitangi Tribunal and the New 
Zealand courts have all recognised the Treaty of W aitangi as a basic 
constitutional document of New Zealand. 2 It is unlikely that its importance as a 
constitutional document will decline in the foreseeable future. 
As well as having constitutional significance the Treaty has continued to have 
an ongoing impact on the development and life of New Zealand. The Royal 
Commission on Social Policy for instance stated that the "Treaty is central to 
understandings of New Zealand society, its historical development and 
contemporary realities."3 
III NEW ZEALAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS: AN OVERVIEW 
The new system of constitutional law and government in New Zealand 
implemented after the signing of the Treaty began with the New South Wales 
Continuance Act 1840 (Imp.) and the Letters Patent issued pursuant to that Act 
in November 1840.4 These enactments acknowledged New Zealand as a 
1 John Hamilton Wallace (ed) Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a 
Better Democracy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 81 ["Towards a Better Democracy'l 
2 Acknowledgment by successive governments of the constitutional significance of the Treaty 
can be seen in the Fourth Labour Government's Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of 
Waitangi (1989) (these can be found in P. Harris and S. Levine (eds) The New Zealand Politics 
Source Book (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1994) 30-32.) and also the National 
Government's Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty ofWaitangi Claims (see Dept of Justice 
Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty ofWaitangi Claims: Summary (Government Print, 
Wellington, 1994).) The Waitangi Tribunal's perspective is encapsulated well in: Waitangi 
Tribunal Motunui-Waitara Report - Wai 6 (2ed) (Dept of Justice, Wellington, 1989) 45-49. 
Examples of New Zealand court judgments that have referred to this are New Zealand Maori 
Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 and Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley 
Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188. 
3 Royal Commission on Social Polley The April Report vol II: Future Directions (Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1988) 76. 
4 Morag McDowell & Duncan Webb The New Zealand Legal System: Structures, Processes and 
Legal Theory (2ed) (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 103 ["The New Zealand Legal System"]. 
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separate colony and set up some basic constitutional arrangements. Notably 
the Letters Patent created a Legislative Council with appointed members. 
5 
The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp.) was the next Act that effectively 
changed the constitutional institutions of New Zealand.6 This Act divided New 
Zealand into six provinces and established a system of provincial government 
It also established a bicameral system of central government This bicameral 
system consisted of the existing Legislative Council as an upper house and a 
new General Assembly with elected members as a lower house. 
There have been three main changes to New Zealand's constitutional 
institutions since the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp.). Both the 
Provincial Councils7 and the Legislative Council were abolished in 1875 and 
1950 respectively.8 This left New Zealand with a unicameral system. The other 
change was that the Electoral Act 1993 introduced Mixed Member Proportional 
voting (MMP) which was a move away from the "Westminster style" First Past 
the Post system (FPP). This change has affected the performance of the 
legislative and executive branches of government 9 
Maori did receive special recognition through the creation of four Maori seats 
in the General Assembly under the Maori Representation Act 1867. However, 
this was only recognition within the electoral system rather than on a 
constitutional level. Also this separate electoral representation was not granted 
as a way of reflecting or honouring the Treaty. Rather, it was intended to be a 
temporary measure until the individualisation of Maori land tenure made it 
SJhe New Zealand Legal System above n 4, 103. 
6Although the Act of the Constitution of Government in the New Zealand Islands 1846 (Imp.) 
was passed which was to implement systems of representative government these changes 
were never put in place. See The New Zealand Legal System above n 4, 104. 
7 This was done under the Abohtion of Provinces Act 1875, see The New Zealand Legal System 
above n 4, 106. 
s This was done under the Legislative Council Abohtion Act 1950, see The New Zealand Legal 
System above n 4, 108. 
9 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 3 ["Bridled Power'l 
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practicable for Maori to qualify for electoral enrolment in terms of the 
European property qualification. 10 The decision to set the number of Maori 
seats at four was also not based on the Treaty. Although intended to be 
temporary the Maori seats have been retained and were increased in number to 
five as a consequence of the change to MMP. This continuance and recent 
increase were not intended as ways to reflect or honour the Treaty.11 As 
Sorrenson notes, there has been little political advantage for any political party 
in abolishing the seats "in the face of what was bound to be considerable Maori 
opposition'' and so they have remained. 12 Under MMP the number of Maori 
seats was increased so that the number of seats that Maori received was more 
proportionate to the number of Maori on the Maori electoral roll. 
New Zealand's legislative system therefore derived from and is still very 
similar to the Westminster system apart from the absence of an upper house . 
Adaptations that have been made to these "inherited" institutions have not 
been made to reflect our unique position in relation to the Treaty. The lack of 
adaptations to these Westminster style institutions has occurred despite the fact 
that the New Zealand Parliament has had the ability to amend its own 
constitution since 1947.13 The ability to develop independently from Britain 
was made even more apparent in section 16 of the New Zealand Constitution 
Act 1986.14 This section removed all remaining power for the British 
10 Alan D. McRobie "Ethnic Representation: The New Zealand Experience" in Stephen Levine 
(ed) Politics in New Zealand: A Reader (Allen & Unwin, Auckland, 1978) 272. 
11 The number of Maori seats is increasing to six at the next general election. 
12 M.P.K. Sorrenson "A History of Maori Representation in Parhament" in John Hamilton 
Wallace (ed) Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) B-58 ["History of Maori Representation"]. 
13 This power was achieved under the New Zealand Constitution Amendment (Request and 
Consent) Act 1947 and the New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 (Imp.). Under 
the New Zealand Constitution Amendment (Request and Consent) Act 1947 the New Zealand 
Parhament requested and consented to the Imperial Parliament passing legislation that would 
enable the New Zealand Parliament to amend and repeal its own constitution. This request 
was agreed to by the Imperial Parhament in the New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 
1947 which enabled the New Zealand Parliament to alter, suspend or repeal at any time all or 
any of its constitutional provisions. See The New Zealand Legal System above n 4, 108. 
14 Paul McHugh The Maori Magna Carta (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991) 64 ["The 
Maori Magna Cartd'] . 
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Parliament to legislate for New Zealand. This essay suggests that the lack of 
adaptations to these "inherited" institutions is because of inertia and an 
unquestioning attachment to them. 
IV RECENT PROPOSALS FOR A MAORI LEGISLATIVE BODY 
The early 1980s to mid 1990s was a period in which various groups called for 
the development of a separate Maori legislative body in an attempt to reflect 
the principles of the Treaty in our constitution. These calls revolved around the 
"Three House Model". The Three House Model incorporates two legislative 
houses - one for Pakeha,15 one for Maori and a Senate (or "Treaty House", as its 
proponents call it) with both Maori and Pakeha representation. (See Appendix 
One) 
The Three House Model was developed by the Raukawa Trustees16 for 
consideration by a national conference on the Treaty of W aitangi at 
Ngaruawahia in 1984.17 It was presented by Ngati Raukawa to the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System in 1985 and in 1988 to the Royal 
Commission on Social Policy.18 The Raukawa District Council, the Aotearoa 
Broadcasting System Inc and the New Zealand Maori Council also adopted the 
Three House Model in submissions to the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System.19 
1s The use of the word Pakeha in this essay is taken to include all those of non-Maori ethnicity. 
This is problematic as Polynesians, Asians and those with mixed ethnicity do not fit 
comfortably within the term, however this is how the term is used in this essay. 
16 This body represents Ngati Raukawa kite Tonga, te Ati Awa ki Whakarongotai and Ngati 
T oarangatira. 
17 A submission by the New Zealand Maori Council to the New Zealand Royal Commission on 
the Electoral system in Royal Commission on the Electoral System: [transcripts of the hearings and 
submissions] vol 7 (reproduced from typescript, Wellington, 1995) submission 793, 22 ["Maori 
Council Submission"]. 
1s Mason H. Durie "Tino Rangatiratanga" (1995) 1 He Pukenga Korero -A journal of Maori Studies 
44, 51 ["Tino Rangatiratanga"]. 
19 A submission by Whatarangi Winiata on behalf of the Raukawa District Council, the 
Raukawa Trustees, various other bodies in the Raukawa Region and the Aotearoa 
Broadcasting System Inc, to the New Zealand Royal Commission on the Electoral System in 
Royal Commission on the Electoral System: [transcripts of the hearings and submissions] vol 7 
• • • • 
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Much of the detail of the Three House Model has not been worked out. Those 
in support of the model want the general idea to be accepted, at which stage the 
detail of the model can be decided. 20 The general idea is that the Maori House 
and the Pakeha House would both formulate bills. There would be no 
restriction on either house on the areas in which they could formulate bills. 21 
Each legislative house would have its own electoral system and operate by its 
own rules.22 For example, the Maori House would be able to operate within 
tikanga Maori. There would also be scope for the two houses to work together 
in producing bills. 
All the bills produced by the two legislative houses would be sent to the 
Senate. The role of the Senate would be to check primarily the consistency of 
bills with the Treaty and probably also that consultation had occurred between 
the two Houses on each bill. For a bill to be passed by the Senate a majority of 
the representatives of each Treaty partner (Maori and Pakeha) would need to 
support it. If the bill was passed it would be sent to the Governor General for 
royal assent. If not passed the bill would be returned to the two legislative 
houses for further work.23 
Partly in response to the submissions discussed above the Royal Commission 
on the Electoral System made a recommendation that "Parliament and 
Government should enter into consultations and discussions with a wide range 
of representatives of the Maori people about the definition and protection of the 
(reproduced from typescript, Wellington, 1995) submission 793; and "New Zealand Maori 
Council Submission" above n 17. 
20 Lecture by Whatarangi Winiata at Victoria University, October 1997. 
21 Transcript of a lecture by Whatarangi Winiata at Massey University, 14 March 1996 entitled 
"Proposal for Parliamentary Arrangements Under the Treaty of Waitangi" 9 ["Proposal for 
Parliamentary Arrangements"). (copy in possession of the author) 
22 "Proposal for Parliamentary Arrangements" above n 21, 9. 
23 Transcript of a lecture by Whatarangi Winiata at the Conference "The Treaty of Waitangi: 
Maori Pohtical Representation- Future Challenges" held at Pipitea Marae, Wellington, 1-2 May 
1997. Arranged by the New Zealand Institute of Pubhc Law, the New Zealand Institute for 
Dispute Resolution and the New Zealand Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Appendix 2. 
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rights of the Maori people and the recognition of their constitutional position 
under the Treaty of W aitangi."24 In describing possible approaches to 
recognising Maori within constitutional arrangements the Royal Commission 
recognised the possibility that Maori people could be more formally recognised 
in New Zealand's legislative processes and institutions.25 
Churches are one identifiable group, apart from various Maori organisations, 
who have been proponents of the Three House Model. The two denominations 
that have been most involved in this are the Methodists and the Anglicans. The 
Methodists were the first church to adopt a constitutional arrangement 
reflecting principles of the Treaty. The church committed itself to biculturalism 
in 1983.26 In decision-making processes now at Methodist conferences Maori 
and Pakeha members may caucus separately and decisions are made only 
when both partners can state that they agree.27 When they do not agree, no 
decision can be made and further negotiation must take place. The Methodist 
church has supported national constitutional change to a Treaty-based system 
of political representation since 1989, reaffirming it at conferences over several 
years. 28 
The Anglican church developed a separate Maori branch in 1925.29 A 1984 
report suggested that the 1857 constitution of the Anglican Church should be 
revised so that the principles of the Treaty could be expressed and entrenched 
within it. 30 In 1992 an adaptation of the Three House Model was formally 
24 Towards a Better Democracy above n 1, 112. 
2s Towards a Better Democracy above n 1, 112 . 
26 Anon The Bicultural Journey: Ten Years On, 1993, 2 ["The Bicultural Journey''] . A pamphlet 
prepared for the Methodist conference on the Tauiwi perspective of the bicultural changes 
made in the Church. (copy in the possession of Rev. Barry Jones) 
27 The Bicultural Journey above n 26, 4-5. 
2s Wellington Bicultural Working Group Constitutional Change Studies (Wellington, 1997) Study 
1, Sheet 3, 2. (copy in the possession of Rev. Barry Jones) 
29 Bicultural Commission of the Anglican Church, Discussion Paper on the Treaty of Waitangi, 
1984, 1 ["Discussion Paper on the Treaty of Waitangi"] . (copy in the possession of Rev. Barry 
Jones) 
30 Discussion Paper on the Treaty ofWaitangi above n 29, 3. 
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adopted by the church into its constitution.31 The Bishopric of Aotearoa, Te 
Pihopatanga o Aotearoa, is currently promoting the Three House Model for a 
national level.32 
Recent strong calls for constitutional change from Maori came from three hui 
held at Hirangi marae in 1995 and 1996.33 The first hui in January 1995 was 
attended by nearly a thousand Maori from both the North and South Island. 34 
The hui sought to set aside the Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of 
Waitangi Claims in favour of constitutional change on the basis of the Treaty of 
W aitangi. A constitutional review process to be undertaken by Maori and the 
government was proposed. The second hui focused on tino rangatiratanga. A 
major issue discussed was "achieving constitutional change suitable to 
Maori". 35 The third hui was attended by approximately 2000 Maori from 
around the country.36 It looked at possible options for constitutional change. 
Included among ten other options was the Three House Model.r No 
preference was made for any option at the hui but a body was established to 
report on the options. The body was to consider theoretical and practical 
methods of Maori government drawing on tikanga Maori, pre-colonial systems 
of iwi/hapu government and relevant indigenous experience. 38 This body has 
not yet released a report or any recommendations. 
31 Discussion Paper on the Treaty ofWaitangi above n 29, 3. 
32 "Tino Rangatiratanga" above n 18, 51 . 
33 John Roberts has produced a comprehensive summary of what happened at the three hui. 
See John Roberts Alternative Vision: The significance of the Hirangi Hui Ooint Public Questions 
Committee of the Methodist Church of New Zealand and Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa 
New Zealand, Wellington, 1996) ["Alternative Vision"]. 
34 Alternative Vision above n 33, 3. 
35 Alternative Vision above n 33, 11. 
36 Alternative Vision above n 33, 15. 
37 Hui Notes from the Hirangi Hui 1996, 47-50 ["Hirangi Hui Notes"]. (Copy in the possession 
of the author) 
38 "Hirangi Hui Notes" above n 37, 51. 
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V EARLY CALLS FOR A MAORI LEGISLATIVE BODY 
Recent calls for constitutional change through the development of a separate 
Maori legislative body are not the first of their kind in New Zealand history. In 
the period from the mid 1880s to the early 1890s two Maori movements, the 
Kotahitanga and the Kingitanga, both called for Crown recognition of a 
separate Maori legislative body. Also both the Kotahitanga and Kingitanga 
movements set up their own parliaments known as the Paremata Maori (Maori 
Parliament) and the Kauhanganui (Great Council) respectively. Both 
movements viewed Article Two of the Treaty as one justification for having a 
Maori parliament 39 Other justifications were Article 3 of the Declaration of 
Independence which allowed for a congress to meet annually to make laws and 
section 71 of the Constitution Act 1852 which provided for separate Maori 
districts.40 
A The Kotahitanga Paremata Maori 
The Kotahitanga movement represented a coalition of iwi from both the North 
and South Island and as such was highly representative of Maori. However, it 
did not embrace the Kingitanga movement or Te Whiti and his followers. 41 
The Paremata Maori was established by the Kotahitanga in 1892 and existed for 
11 years. 42 Before it was established two iwi affiliated with Kotahitanga had 
already unsuccessfully petitioned Queen Victoria to establish a Maori 
legislative body.43 Nga Puhi in 1882 had requested the establishment of a 
39See Lindsay Cox Kotahitanga, (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) 58, 69 
['Kotahitanga"]; and also part of an interview with Hone Heke in W.D. McIntyre & W.J. 
Gardner (eds) Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971) 
163-164 ["Hone Heke"]. 
40 Kotahitanga above n 39, 58,69 and "Hone Heke" above n 39, 163-164. 
41Kotahitanga above n 39, 70. 
42 J.A. Williams Politics of the New Zealand Maori : Protest and Co-operation, 1891-1909 (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1%9) 52 ["Politics of the New Zealand Maori'l 
43 It is interesting to note that the petitions or deputations to the Queen by groups affiliated 
with both the Kotahitanga and Kingitanga movements were dealt with not by the Queen but 
11 
Maori parliament "which shall hold in check the European authorities who are 
endeavouring to put aside the Treaty of Waitangi".44 Then later in 1891, Te 
Arawa petitioned for "the formation of a representative council, to be elected 
by your Maori subjects" 45 that was to provide a place where all measures 
affecting Maori could be clearly reviewed and dealt with. It was planned that 
the decisions of the council would be forwarded to the Queen and the national 
Parliament for consideration.46 
The Paremata Maori had structural similarities to the Westminster system. It 
had two houses: Te Whare o Raro (the lower house) and Te Whare o Runga or 
Te Runanga Ariki (the upper house or the Council of Paramount Chiefs). 47 Te 
Whare o Raro was made up of elected members from electorates based on tribal 
boundaries.48 The membership of Te Whare o Runga was chosen by the 
members of Te Whare o Raro. The chosen members were predominantly 
ariki. 49 It therefore contained a mixture of both traditional Maori representation 
and new electoral representation. 
The Paremata Maori spent much of its time discussing potential changes which 
could be made to New Zealand's constitutional arrangements to incorporate 
their Paremata within them.50 They also discussed the jurisdiction their 
Paremata should have and the relationship it should have with both the Crown 
and the national Parliament They presented three major petitions to 
Parliament to have their Paremata Maori recognised. 
by Lord Derby, the then Secretary of State. The groups were all informed that these matters 
were the domain of the colonial Government not the Queen. See Politics of the New Zealand 
Maori above n 42, 43, 51-52. 
44 Ranginui J. Walker Struggle Without End - Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, (Penguin, Auckland, 
1990) 160-161 ["Struggle Without End'1-
45 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, 51. 
46 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, 51. 
47 Angela Ballara "Wahine Rangatira: Maori Women of Rank and their Role in the Women's 
Kotahitanga Movement of the 1890s" (1993) 27 New Zealand Journal of History, 127, 132 
["W ahine Rangatira"]. 
48 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, 53 
49 "Wahine Rangatira" above n 47, 132. 
so Kotahitanga above n 39, 68. 
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The first submission in 1892 requested that power be given to Maori to make 
laws for the conduct of Maori, their lands and possessions.51 There was no 
apparent response made by Parliament to this submission. 
In 1893 the Federated Maori Assembly Empowering Bill was drafted.52 This 
Bill was the first detailed statement of what the Paremata Maori wanted. It 
proposed that the power to govern Maori should be delegated to the Federated 
Maori Assembly of New Zealand, which was to be identical to the structure of 
the existing Paremata Maori, on par with the national Parliament and subject 
only to the Governor. 53 The bill was not debated by Parliament 
In 1894 a Native Rights Bill was drafted which Hone Heke, a Maori MP and 
dedicated member of the Paremata Maori, introduced into the national 
Parliament This Bill provided for a separate Maori legislature that was to 
enact laws to "relate to and exclusively deal with the personal rights and with 
the lands and all other property of the aboriginal native inhabitants of New 
Zealand". 54 However, the passage of the Bill was prevented by MPs leaving 
during its debate until there was no quorum. Consequently the debate was 
adjourned. After the lack of quorum in 1894 the Native Rights Bill was sent 
back to Parliament for a second time. It was rejected by Parliament in 1896. 55 
B The Kingitanga Kauhanganui 
The Kingitanga movement initially began in the 1850s as a pan-Maori 
movement but by the 1870s it was predominantly associated with Waikato iwi. 
51 Struggle Without End above n 44, 167. 
52 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, SS. 
53 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, SS. 
54 The 'Native Rights Bill' presented to the General Assembly by Hone Heke in 1894 in W.D. 
McIntyre and W.J. Gardner (eds) Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1971) 164-165. 
55 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, 56. 
13 
In 1894 King Tawhiao56 led a delegation to visit Queen Victoria to ask for 
consideration of a proposal to establish a separate Maori parliamentary 
system.57 Under his proposal, control over land issues would reside with the 
new Maori Parliament, and a Queen appointee would act as a liaison with the 
colonial Parliament58 As in the case of the Nga Puhl and Te Arawa petitions, 
Tawhiao's petition was unsuccessful. Tawhiao also presented a proposal in 
1886 to John Ballance, the then Native Minister, that suggested the formation of 
a Legislative Council of Chiefs. 59 Ballance declined this proposal. 
The lack of consideration of Tawhiao's proposals prompted him to establish the 
Kauhanganui in 1892.60 He planned the Kauhanganui to be a national 
parliament with wide representation. However, despite invitations being sent 
to all the iwi in New Zealand, participation remained confined to the inner 
circle of Kingitanga support.61 The Kauhanganui met regularly until the 
1920s.62 
The Kauhanganui like the Paremata Maori adopted a Westminster style 
parliamentary model. It had two Kauhanga (councils) which were the 
equivalent of houses. One kauhanga was for manukura (nobles) while the 
other was for matariki (commoners). The Kauhanganui's legislation had to be 
ratified by King Tawhiao.63 A constitution enacted in 1894 outlined the 
functions and structure of the Kauhanganui.64 
56 Tawhiao was the second king of the Kingitanga movement. For more information on the 
King movement and King Tawhiao see Kotahitanga above n 39, 51-53. 
57 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, 43. 
ss Kotahitanga above n 39, 58. 
59 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, 43. 
60 Kotahitanga above n 39, 59. 
61 Kotahitanga above n 39, 59. 
62 Kotahitanga above n 39, 59. 
63 Kotahitanga above n 39, 59. 
64 A translation published in a Wellington newspaper of the constitution for the Kingdom of 
Aotearoa adopted by the Kauhanganui in W.D. McIntyre and W.J. Gardner (eds) Speeches and 
Documents on New Zealand History (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971) 165-168. 
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The Kauhanganui had different political aspirations to the Paremata Maori. 
The Paremata Maori' s goal was to be constitutionally recognised as having 
jurisdiction over specific areas which concerned Maori. By contrast, after the 
rejection of Tawhiao' s original proposals, the Kauhanganui sought to make all 
the laws for their distinct geographical area rather than confining itself to laws 
just relating to Maori issues. 65 
C Early Maori Constitutional Theories and Practice 
By the 1900s, therefore, groups within Maoridom had developed constitutional 
theory and gained practical experience on developing a Maori legislative body. 
No favoured model emerged though for a Maori legislative body which could 
be incorporated in to New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. Instead 
various ideas on the jurisdiction such a body could have and its possible 
relationships with the national Parliament and the Crown existed. 
There were two general ideas on what the jurisdiction of a Maori legislative 
body could be. These ideas were either a Paremata Maori style jurisdiction 
over specific areas of law that concerned Maori, or a Kauhanganui style 
jurisdiction over a distinct geographic area. Ideas also differed about the level 
of control a Maori legislative body would have over either of these 
jurisdictions. These different ideas are visible through consideration of the 
various views on the relationship a Maori legislative body could have with the 
national parliament and the Crown. One view was that a Maori legislative 
body would formulate legislation but this would require approval from both 
the national Parliament and the Governor before it was enacted. Effectively, 
therefore, the body would have very limited power and essentially hold only 
an advisory role. This moderate view was displayed within the 1891 Te Arawa 
petition. Another view was that a Maori legislative body would be equal to the 
national Parliament and subject only to the Governor. This view is visible in 
65 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, 45-46. 
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proposals of the Paremata Maori and Tawhiao' s early petitions. The last and 
most extreme view was that the body would neither be subject to the national 
Parliament nor the Governor. Rather, it would be a fully independent 
legislative body. This view was prevalent in later Kingitanga proposals and 
actions. 
It is unclear whether Maori thought the membership of an officially recognised 
Maori legislative body and the national Parliament should intersect or be 
mutually exclusive. In the 1890s some members of the Paremata Maori or 
Kauhanganui were also members of the national Parliament for example, 
Eparaima Kapa, Hone Heke, Wi Pere and Henare Kaihau.66 They became MPs 
through the support of fellow Kotahitanga or Kingitanga members. The 
Paremata Maori spent time considering whether its members should continue 
within the national Parliament.67 It may be that if a Maori legislative body had 
been established it was expected Maori would not sit in that body as well as the 
national Parliament. In this case the continued Maori participation in the 
national Parliament in the 1890s could be explained as a mechanism for 
securing at least some power in a time when their parliaments were not 
recognised. However, this position is unclear and may be incorrect. Maori 
may, in fact, have wished to retain a voice within the national Parliament even 
if they had their own legislative body officially recognised. Therefore, dual 
membership in the national Parliament and an officially established Maori 
legislative body may have been an option. 
Maori constitutional theories have previously received little attention and been 
accorded no serious import for the advancement of New Zealand's 
constitution. This consideration of Maori constitutional theory is based on 
secondary sources. These secondary sources, however, were essentially 
constructed as historical accounts rather than to analyse the constitutional ideas 
66 Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, 57, 103. 
67 Kotahitanga above n 39, 68. 
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of Maori. A reconsideration of primary sources such as the minutes of the 
Paremata Maori and Maori language newspapers is required to achieve a 
clearer picture of these early Maori constitutional theories.68 
VI THE NON-ISSUE OF DEVELOPING A MAORI LEGISLATIVE BODY 
Despite these two periods of calls for a separate Maori legislative body the idea 
of incorporating a Maori legislative body into our constitutional arrangements 
to reflect the Treaty has failed to become an issue. Discussion of incorporating 
the Treaty into our constitution has instead focused on including the Treaty 
through entrenched legislation such as a Bill of Rights Act or Constitution Act 
69 
Research has shown that this is not because the idea of a Maori legislative body 
has been seriously considered and found to be unfeasible, but rather that it has 
not been considered seriously at all. 
The lack of serious consideration on the development of a separate Maori 
legislative body is visible in two ways, firstly, through a survey of the 
published material on the development of a Maori legislative body, and 
secondly through a critique of the sole model for such a body proposed 
recently - the Three House Model. 
A Published Material 
There has only been a small amount of material published that comments on or 
impacts on the idea of a separate Maori legislative body. Material mentioning 
this idea falls within three classes, all of which have failed to provide any 
serious critique or discussion of the idea. 
68 The Alexander Turnbull Library holds some of this information. 
69 For further details of the debate surrounding incorporating the Treaty of Waitangi within 
higher law see Bridled Power above n 9, 266-270. 
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The first class of material contains texts that purely provide accounts of 
movements and groups who have been in support of the idea. These texts 
provide no comment on the idea itself.70 The second class of material expresses 
interest in the idea of developing a separate Maori legislative body or 
incorporating the Treaty into constitutional institutions.71 These supporters, 
however, have not proceeded to discuss potential models or options for how 
this could be achieved. The third class of material has taken a negative stance 
on the idea or expressed doubts about its feasibility. 72 However, the reasons 
provided for the dismissal of the idea are limited to single factors rather than a 
full critique of the idea. 
B The Three House Model 
The Three House Model is the sole model for the development of a Maori 
legislative body proposed recently. In itself the fact that there is only one 
model provides an indication of the very limited consideration given to this 
matter. However, an analysis of the Three House Model makes it even more 
apparent how underdeveloped debate on this matter is. This is because the 
Three House Model is structurally incomplete, inherently flawed in its method 
of incorporating the Treaty, and is incapable of providing effective government 
at a national level. These problems are elaborated on in the following critique 
of the model. The model is critiqued in three ways, firstly in relation to its 
compatibility with the Treaty, secondly in relation to criteria commonly 
considered fundamental to a good constitutional system and finally in relation 
to its practical detail. 
70 For example Kotahitanga above n 39; Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42; and Struggle 
Without End above n 44. 
71 For example The Maori Magna Carta above n 14, 63-65; and D V Williams "The Constitutional 
Status of the Treaty of Waitangi: A Historical Perspective" (1990) 14 NZULR 9, 34-36. 
72 For example Geoffrey Palmer "Where to from Here?" [1995] 25 VUWLR 241, 241-244; and 
Andrew Sharp Justice and the Maori: Maori claims in New Zealand political argument in the 1980s 
(2ed) (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1990) 318 ["Justice and the Maori'1 -
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l Does the Model reflect the Treaty? 
As the purpose of the Three House Model is to incorporate the Treaty into New 
Zealand's constitutional arrangements its construction needs to reflect the 
meaning of the Treaty. Whatarangi Winiata described the principles of the 
Treaty incorporated in the model as the "principles of partnership and the 
fundamental rights of Maori to tino rangatiratanga in relation to the protection 
of" o ratou taonga katoa"". 73 
The Three House Model creates a partnership where each partner has equal 
power. This equal partnership is evidenced through the ability each legislative 
house has to initiate law on any area and the need that each partner's 
agreement is required for bills to be passed. The Court of Appeal, the W aitangi 
Tribunal and Governments have all recognised a partnership principle existing 
within the Treaty.74 However, the partnership principle which has been 
recognised is an incoherent one. This is because, although equality is inherent 
in the idea of partnership, the courts have recognised other Treaty principles 
which place limitations on an equal partnership existing between the Crown 
and Maori.75 An example of this is the principle that the Crown has obligations 
to actively protect Maori. This "active protection" principle implies a measure 
of Maori dependence on the Crown. Mulgan advocates that the partnership 
principle amounts only to the recognition of the separate identity of Maori and 
the Crown and the mutual obligations that exist between them.76 Therefore, 
although partnership is a recognised Treaty principle it is an incoherent 
73 "Maori Council Submission" above n 17, 28. 
74 The Court of Appeal in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 and 
the Waitangi Tribunal in the Muriwhenua Fishing Report were the first constitutional bodies to 
recognise a partnership principle. The government has gone on to use the principle of 
partnership within government pohcy see Richard Mulgan Maori Pakeha and Democracy (2ed) 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989) 109 [" Maori Pakeha and Democracy'l 
75 personal comment, Richard Boast, 4 August 1998. 
76 Richard Mulgan "Can the Treaty of Waitangi provide a Constitutional Basis for New 
Zealand's pohtical future?" (1989) 41 Political Science 51, 61 ["Can the Treaty of Waitangi 
provide a Constitutional Basis"]. 
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principle. This means that the construction of the model around the principle 
of partnership is problematic. 
On top of the principle of partnership being incoherent the actual words of the 
Treaty do not support an equal partnership. This argument ties into the 
concept of tino rangatiratanga which was guaranteed to Maori and which is 
also supposed to be incorporated within the Three House Model. Despite the 
differences between the Maori and Pakeha versions of the Treaty both display 
one form of power was ceded to the Crown while Maori retained another form 
of power. In the English version Maori ceded sovereignty and retained full 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands, estates, forests, fisheries 
and other properties. In the Maori version the Crown received kawanatanga 
and Maori retained tino rangatiratanga over "o ratou wenua, o ratou kainga me 
o ratou taonga katoa". Although royal assent is still required within the Three 
House Model the Governor General will probably continue the constitutional 
convention of not refusing assent thus making this sole power distinction 
between the partners a token one. The notion of an equal partnership 
embodied within the Three House Model therefore fails to recognise the 
distinctions between the powers of each partner. It is likely that the Crown will 
see their rights of sovereignty or kawanatanga to have been limited by the 
Three House Model and Maori also will see their rights of exclusive possession 
or tino rangatiratanga to have been limited. 
That there are interpretation problems with the Treaty is a truism. For this 
reason finding a model which meets with everyone's interpretation of the 
Treaty may be difficult77 The interpretation of the Treaty embodied within the 
Three House Model, however, is one that is particularly limited in the support 
it would receive. Thus the Three House Model is a very poor attempt to reflect 
the meaning of the Treaty within New Zealand's constitutional institutions. 
77 for a discussion of the reasons for interpretation problems existing within the Treaty see The 
Maori Magna Carta above n 14, 3. 
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2 Compatibility with Constitutional Doctrine 
(a) The doctrine of Separation of Powers 
The problem highlighted by analysing the Three House Model in regards to the 
separation of powers is that the make up of the Executive Branch is not clear . 
For example there is no indication of who would be Prime Minister, who 
would be the members of the Cabinet or Executive Council or even if these 
positions would continue to exist at all. The creation of an executive within the 
model, however, would not be impossible. Its uncertainty stems from a lack of 
detail rather than impossibility. 
The essence of separation of powers is not to let one branch of government hold 
all the power and this could be achieved by the Model. 
(b) Parliamentary Sovereignty 
The Three House Model would not affect the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty. The parliamentary system created would still have an 
unequalled, and undisputed law making power. The only change would be in 
the structure of the parliament that holds sovereignty. 
(c) Representative Democracy 
Democracy is commonly accepted as the best form of government. Most 
countries have systems based on representative democracy. In a representative 
democracy all eligible citizens have the same right to vote for representatives 
who will make decisions on their behalf. The aim of a representative 
democracy is for parliament to reflect different groups in society in 
• • • 
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approximately the same proportion as those groups exist in the wider 
population. 78 
The Three House Model follows a "one people, one vote" approach so that 
Maori and Pakeha "peoples" each receive equal power.79 In allotting power in 
this way the Model is incompatible with the concept of representative 
democracy as every citizen is not given the same right in regard to the power 
that their individual votes hold. This is because Maori comprise only 16% of 
the resident New Zealand population and yet their votes would get 50% of the 
power.80 
Although, as stated above, representative democracy is the most commonly 
accepted form of government, it should be noted that it is not the only way to 
govern. The Three House Model, by not following theories of representative 
democracy, is not automatically an unfeasible model. Rather, it challenges the 
ingrained political ideology in New Zealand. New Zealanders are on the 
whole committed democrats. MMP was accepted because it was perceived as 
making our system more democratic. The Model's incompatibility with 
representative democracy, therefore, would be likely to cause public outcry and 
legitimacy problems for the Model. Mulgan provides support for this stating 
that while he could accept that in 1840 it would have been very reasonable for 
Maori to have an equal share of power, today such an idea is impractical and 
unreasonable. 81 The difference is that in 1840 the bulk of the population was 
Maori and the mass of resources were in Maori control. 
Another problem with the" one people, one vote" principle is that "Maori" and 
"Pakeha" peoples are perhaps now not the only "peoples" in New Zealand. 
78 Dr G. Zappala Four Weddings, a Funeral and a Family Reunion: Ethnicity and Representation in 
Australian Federal Politics (AGPS, Canberra, 1997) 4. 
79 "Maori Council Submission" above n 19, 23. 
8oStatistics New Zealand New Zealand Official Yearbook 1998 (GP Pubhcations, Wellington, 1998) 
102 ["1998 Yearbook'']. 
81 "Can the Treaty of Waitangi provide a Constitutional Basis" above n 76, 61 
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Although Asians and Polynesians, for example, will receive representation 
within the Pakeha legislative house, the categorisation of all non-Maori as 
Pakeha and one "people" is forced. The problem is partly one of terminology. 
However, the focus on Maori and Pakeha (a term which suggests European) 
may lead to other ethnic groups within New Zealand not being taken fully into 
account. 
(d) Effective Parliament 
It has been said that "MMP adds new, more complicated dynamics to 
government structures and processes, but because these allow more points of 
view to be heard, developed and considered in the process of governing, our 
democracy will be enhanced".82 The Three House Model would also add new 
"complications" to our parliamentary system but these would probably not be 
applauded (save the fact that it would give Geoffrey Palmer the chance to write 
a book entitled "Too Bridled Power''). 
Although the production of two bills on the same area will provide a greater 
consideration of options available there will be many problems created. Gashes 
will inevitably occur between the content of bills from different legislative 
Houses. In this situation, if the Senate cannot decide which bill is the best, they 
will both have to be returned to the legislative houses for further work. It 
would seem more sensible and less convoluted for either both Houses to work 
together in the first place or for only one House to be in charge of certain areas 
as proposed by the Paremata Maori and in King Tawhiao's early proposals. 
The passing of bills by the Senate from different Houses may also lead to 
inconsistency and lack of direction in the overall legislative scheme. The ability 
of both legislative Houses to develop legislation on any area of law therefore 
seems ineffective and very wasteful of time and resources. 
s2 Bridled Power above n 9, 20. 
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The Model would slow down the passage of legislation by just the extra step of 
requiring Senate consideration and maybe additional time too if referred back 
to the legislative houses. In itself this is not objectionable. Many countries have 
a Senate as a mechanism to improve their legislation. The real problem comes 
from the Senate requiring both a Maori and Pakeha majority within it to pass 
bills. The Methodist experience has been that on some issues one partner says 
"yes" while the other says "no", hence no compromise can be reached. Thus 
the "whole matter ends up being put in the too hard basket'' .83 While the 
church has been able to defer making decisions, in a national Parliament there 
has to be a means of reaching an authoritative answer. 
The Three House Model, therefore, does not provide a totally ineffective 
parliament but the requirement of agreement between Maori and Pakeha for 
any legislation to be passed makes it an unworkable option for a national 
model. 
(e) Political Cohesion 
The Model can be seen as politically divisive in the sense that it separates Maori 
and Pakeha. The aim of a separate Maori legislative house has not, however, 
been to separate Maori and Pakeha but rather to establish a co-operative 
partnership between them under the Treaty of W aitangi. The structure of the 
Model requires each legislative house to get its bills past the Senate so anything 
either House wants to pass will require a consideration of the other partner's 
point of view. Although the two partners are separate, co-operation and a 
respect for the other's point of view would be essential which would ensure the 
system was cohesive. 
83 see David Bell ' s comments in "The price of sharing power" Cross/ink, Wellington. New Zealand, 
February 1996, 9. 
UBR 
ICTOR/A UNIVERSI fY WELLINGTON 
24 
(f) Legitimacy 
People need to feel that the institutions and processes for making practical 
decisions are by law, custom and moral principle the right and proper ways to 
make such decisions. 84 Legitimacy of a constitutional system is required for 
stability and because a referendum will probably be held to change 
constitutional arrangements the model will need wide support before it is 
implemented anyway. 
The experience of the Methodist church in its adoption of an adaptation of the 
Three House Model has been that only a minority of church members have 
really been in support of the model. The bulk of other church members appear 
to have tolerated it There is a distinct faction within the church though, who 
have searched for softer bicultural options, while others have left the church 
altogether.85 For a national constitutional system, wider support than exists 
within the Methodist church will be required. The level of actual support 
within the church though is probably an indicator of the low level of support 
the model would also get within the wider community. 
Huge legitimacy problems are foreseeable in trying to implement the Three 
House Model. The reasons for this stem from the problems with the model that 
have already been discussed. For example, it would not meet with many 
peoples understanding of the Treaty and representative democracy would 
probably be seen to be more important than upholding the Treaty in the 
manner embodied by the Model. 
84D. Butler and A Ranney in Mark Gobbi The Quest for Legitimacy LLM Thesis, Victoria University, 
1994, 25 . 
85 The Bi-cultural Journey above n 23 , 13-14. 
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3 Is the Model practicable? 
The Royal Commission on the Electoral System rejected the idea of a Senate 
stating that "we believe that the re-introduction of a satisfactory second 
Chamber would be very difficult to achieve". 86 The Three House Model 
involves the introduction of two additional houses. Already this critique has 
noted many details that will need to be settled before the model can be 
implemented (for example, the issue of who would be the executive). Other 
details would also need to be settled to do with what administrative and 
deparbnental support each house would receive. Even if all the details of the 
model could be worked out satisfactorily the Model would be inefficient in 
both a practical and an economic sense . 
4 Overall Feasibility 
The Three House Model is clearly an unworkable model for implementation at 
a national level. The fundamental reason for this is the equal power that exists 
between the partners. This does not fit with generally accepted interpretations 
of the Treaty which will lead on to the model not being seen as legitimate. The 
equal power relationship in the Senate also leaves the possibility open for 
decisions not being reached thus creating an ineffective parliament Other 
factors also, within the Model, aside from those stemming from the equal 
partnership, make the Model unfeasible. Especially notable is the expense 
involved in such a complex model. 
As discussed above, the incompleteness, incompatibility with the Treaty and 
flaws within this Model make it unfeasible as a national model. The fact that 
the sole model proposed recently for developing a Maori legislative body is of 
such poor quality is an indication of how underdeveloped debate and thought 
on this matter is. 
86 Towards a Better Democracy above n 1, 282. 
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VII WHY HAS A MAORI LEGISLATIVE BODY BEEN A NON-ISSUE? 
The preceding discussion has shown that there has been only limited support 
for the idea of developing a Maori legislative body as well as a paucity of 
thought, comment and debate on it It is suggested that there are a number of 
contributing factors for the idea of incorporating the Treaty into our 
constitution through a Maori legislative body failing to receive broad support 
or becoming an explored option. These factors can be categorised within the 
areas of the attitudes of groups, circumstances and academic limitations. Many 
of these factors were also influential in the Kotahitanga and the early 
Kingitanga proposals for a Maori legislative body losing support and failing to 
become an issue. 
A Attitudes of Groups 
1 Maori 
It would be expected that if any group within society was to call for the 
development of a Maori legislative body to incorporate the Treaty into our 
constitutional institutions, it would be Maori. Such calls and the support 
behind them may then act to make the development of a Maori legislative body 
an issue. However, although some Maori have recently called for a Maori 
legislative body, as outlined above, this has only been a small proportion of 
Maori. 
There is one main reason why few Maori have called for the Treaty to be 
incorporated into our constitutional arrangements through a Maori legislative 
body. The reason is that there are many different understandings of what the 
Treaty means and how it is relevant today. Not all Maori understandings of 
the Treaty support the idea of giving constitutional effect to the Treaty through 
a legislative body. In particular there are many different understandings of 
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"tino rangatiratanga" which was guaranteed to Maori in Article Two of the 
Maori version of the Treaty. While there is general agreement that tino 
rangatiratanga is about greater Maori control over things Maori, there is no 
general agreement on what level of control Maori should have and at what 
social level this should exist.87 For example, tino rangatiratanga, could exist 
either at hapu level, iwi level, pan-iwi level or a combination of these. For 
many Maori therefore, the creation of a constitutionally recognised Maori 
legislative body is incompatible with their understandings of what tino 
rangatiratanga means and what it should involve today. 
Another reason for why few Maori have supported the idea of a Maori 
legislative house is that it is not seen to fit with tikanga Maori.88 Adopting a 
"Pakeha" parliamentary style governance would be contrary to tikanga Maori 
in many ways. For example, such a house would be adopting legislative 
procedures unlike those of traditional Maori tikanga.89 An example of the 
adoption of Pakeha institutions affecting tikanga Maori is seen in the Paremata 
Maori's adoption of a Westminster Style Model which because of its exclusively 
male nature inadvertently excluded Wahine Rangatira. 90 
2 Government 
Successive governments have not made time nor have they been prepared to 
discuss the idea of institutional change which has impeded this from becoming 
an issue. Recommendations for government participation in discussion from 
the Royal Commission on the Electoral System and the Hirangi Hui have not 
been followed. There is a sense that governments are blocking the issue, as did 
87 "Tino Rangatiratanga" above n 18, 45 . For interesting comments by Maori about the importance of 
tribes and how a Maori parliament could lead to fighting among tribes see Stephen Levine and Raj 
Vasil Maori Political Perspectives: He Whakaaro Maori Mo Nga Ti Kanga Kawanatanga (Hutchinson 
Group, Auckland, 1995) 98-99 ["Maori Political Perspective 's "]. 
88 "Hirangi Hui notes" above n 37, 49. 
89 For a discussion of Maori political processes and methods see Maori, Pakeha and Democracy 
above n 74, 57-59. 
90 "Wahine Rangatira" above n 47, 130-131. 
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the governments of the 1880s and 1890s. The Crown/Maori Governance Strategy, 
Draft 7 displayed a government view that any increase of Maori authority 
should be done within current constitutional arrangements. 91 
The main reason governments appear to have avoided or dismissed the idea is 
that they are very protective of the continuance of parliamentary sovereignty. 
This was displayed in a letter that Jim Bolger sent to Sir Hepi Te Heuheu in 
1995 before the second Hirangi Hui. Bolger stated "there is no political will to 
alter fundamental constitutional arrangements of the nation involving the 
sovereignty of an elected Parliament The New Zealand Parliament applies 
equally to all the people of New Zealand and the sovereignty of Parliament is 
not divisible."92 This fixation with parliamentary sovereignty in itself points to 
a continued subscription to Diceyan principles. This subscription indicates that 
governments have been mentally locked into, and committed to, traditional 
styles of government. 
In any case the earlier analysis of the Three House Model showed that 
parliamentary sovereignty need not necessarily be lost in the development of a 
separate Maori legislative body. Rather, the configuration of the parliament 
holding that sovereignty may merely change. 
3 The "One Nation" New 'Zealand Attitude 
Some New Zealanders are not prepared to consider the development of two 
legislative bodies based on ethnic characteristics as it challenges the idea of 
New Zealand being a single nation.93 There is a view among many New 
Zealanders that any sort of separate representation is wrong because it either 
provides especially favourable treatment for one group, or, on the contrary it is 
91 Mason H. Durie Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-Determination (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1997) 232 ["Te Mand'] . 
92 Alternative Vision above n 33, 9-10. 
93 Te Mana above n 91, 232. 
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a form of apartheid. More moderately, it is also claimed that separate 
representation is socially and politically divisive. 94 
The analysis of the Three House Model however, showed that, although a 
Maori legislative body does separate Maori and Pakeha, the focus can be on co-
operation so that people effectively are more aware and respectful of the other's 
needs than before. This intention was visible even in the 1891 Te Arawa 
petition to the Queen which expressly denied the intention to separate the 
races: it merely wanted to give full effect to the terms of the Treaty.95 
4 The "Too Hard" and "Not the Right Time" Attitudes 
A common set of attitudes is that developing a separate Maori legislative body 
or even changing our constitutional institutions is either too hard an option to 
consider or is such a complex matter that it should only be tackled if a 
constitutional crisis or issue arises which makes it necessary. These attitudes 
have led to the idea not being explored at all. The idea has effectively been 
dismissed, and the absence of constitutional crisis or major constitutional 
restructuring in New Zealand's history has meant discussions have not been 
necessary. 
An example of such a dismissal of the idea of constitutional change involving 
the Treaty can be seen in the statement of Jenny Shipley that "The Treaty 
should form the basis of any new constitution of the future - but this would be 
an "incredibly complex process".% Sharp has also put a dampener on the idea 
in his comment that "To fix the persons who now exist in a constitution 
94 Elizabeth M. McLeay "Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back", (1991) 43 Political Science 30, 
36-37. 
95The Politics of the New Zealand Maori above n 42, 51. 
% "Maori call for repubhc debate" Sunday Star Times, Auckland, New Zealand, 2 August 1998, 
A2 ["Maori call for repubhc debate"]. 
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designed to be a "full and final settlement'' of what the relations between them 
should be, will I suspect be impossible in New Zealand/ Aotearoa."97 
B Circumstances 
Calls for change to constitutional institutions increased through the 1980s and 
1990s and peaked at the Hirangi Hui. After these hui, however, calls of 
support decreased rather than increased. This meant that the level of support 
for the idea did not reach a level which eventuated in it becoming a national 
issue. Two reasons are suggested for the decrease rather than increase of calls 
for change. 
1 Treaty Settlements 
Despite the opposition to the Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of 
Waitangi Claims groups of Maori became involved once Treaty Settlements were 
implemented as government policy. This meant that the focus of Maori who 
were in support of the idea moved from constitutional change towards the 
settlement process. 
Also the settlement process has given groups of Maori who have settled with 
the Crown the potential to have more control over themselves through the 
return of resources and monetary compensation. This may have led to support 
for attaining power at a national level weakening. Parallels are able to be 
drawn in this respect with the Maori Councils Act of 1900 which Sorrenson 
gives as one of the factors that led to decrease in support for the Paremata 
Maori. 98 This Act gave increased power to Maori at a community level. 
97 Justice and the Maori above n 72, 318. 
98 "History of Maori Representation" above n 12, B-29-30. 
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2 MMP 
Sorrenson' s history of Maori political representation indicates that better Maori 
political representation in the 1890s was highly influential in the end of the 
Paremata Maori.99 It is suggested that better Maori political representation 
achieved through the introduction of MMP was also influential in calls for 
constitutional change dying out rather than escalating in the 1990s. 
Before the introduction of MMP, Maori representation in Parliament was not 
very satisfactory. As discussed above, pre-MMP Maori had four seats in 
Parliament From 1943 the Labour Party had a very strong hold on all the 
Maori seats due to an alliance with the Ratana movement. 100 This meant that 
when Labour was in opposition there was often ineffective Maori political 
representation.101 There was also frequent dissatisfaction with the performance 
of the four Maori members and their low level of accountabilitv back to ., 
electorates. This was because, even when Maori members got into Cabinet, 
Parliament rarely gave full effect to Maori concerns raised and the size of 
electorates meant it was difficult to maintain contact with the electorate.10" 
One of the major reasons that the Royal Commission on the Electoral System 
supported the introduction of MMP was that they thought it would benefit 
Maori. 103 The first MMP election in 1996 definitely displayed a change in the 
level of Maori participation and representation. A record number of Maori 
candidates stood for election. These candidates included activists who had in 
the past advocated the boycotting of elections and constitutional change - for 
example, Tariana Turia, Tame lti and Ken Mair. Election Day also saw the 
largest turnout ever of Maori voters. Most importantly, however, a record 
number of 15 Maori candidates were elected. This number of MPs provided 
99 "History of Maori Representation" above n 12, B29-42 . 
100 Towards a Better Democracy above n 1. 85. 
101 See Maori Political Perspective 's above n 87, chapter 5. 
102 Te Mana above n 91 , 96-98. 
103 Towards a Better Democracy above n 1. 110. 
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Maori parliamentary representation in a proportion which matched that of 
Maori in the total population. 104 
Not only were there more Maori representatives in Parliament after the first 
MMP election but more political influence and power was gained by Maori. In 
the period leading up to the coalition agreement between the National party 
and the New Zealand First party it was apparent that Maori MPs, and behind 
them Maori voters, held the balance of power. The Cabinet formed by the 
coalition also displayed a stronger Maori presence than ever before.105 
Furthermore, the National party Cabinet formed after the coalition collapse has 
retained a prominent Maori presence.106 The minority National Government is 
also reliant on the support of Maori MPs. Thus giving Maori MPs a degree of 
power which may prove crucial in getting Maori issues on to the government's 
agenda. Maori input into bills affecting Maori interests has also increased, with 
nine of the ten Maori Affairs Select Committee members being Maori. w 
C Academic Limitations 
As discussed above, some published academic material has referred to the idea 
of adopting a Maori legislative body into our constitutional arrangements to 
reflect the Treaty. However, this material does not provide a full critique of the 
idea, potential models for such a body, nor directions for development of the 
idea. This lack of published material as a basis for discussion has been 
104 Anne Sullivan "Maori Politics and Government Policies" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Politics in Transition (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 369. 
105Winston Peters as Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer, Tau Henare as Minister of Maori Affairs, 
Minister of Racing, and Associate Minister for Sport, Fitness and Leisure, and Tuariki Delamere as 
Associate Treasurer. Minister in charge of the Valuation Department and Minister in charge of the 
Public Trust Office. 
106 Tau Henare is the Associate Minister of Education and Corrections as well as the Minister of Maori 
Affairs while Georgina Te Heuheu is Minister of Courts and Women 's Affairs and Associate Minister in 
charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations. Also, Tuariki Delamere has been an appointed a Minister 
outside Cabinet. He is Minister of Immigration, Minister of Pacific Island Affairs, Minister in charge of 
the Public Office, Associate Minister of Finance and Associate Minister of Health 
107 Arthur Anae, Joe Hawke, Manu Alamein Kopu, Sandra Lee, Hon Robyn McDonald, Tukuroirangi 
Morgan, Dover Samuels (Deputy Chairperson), Tariana Turia, Georgina Te Heuheu (Chairperson). and 
Rana Waitai. 
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influential in the idea not becoming an issue. Some of the factors discussed 
above have led to political scientists and constitutional lawyers not producing 
work on this idea. Further to these though, are some specific factors relevant to 
the academic field. 
If New Zealand has had any constitutional or political theory it has really been 
a theory of distrust and a lack of interest in theory. 108 This means there is not a 
developed political or constitutional theory about the New Zealand 
constitution. Therefore, the principles and assumptions which underlie our 
constitutional system have rarely been analysed or criticised and options for 
changing our constitutional institutions have not generally been considered. 109 
The general practice in New Zealand constitutional law and political science 
has been to rely or draw on the practice, precedent and theories of other 
countries. Reliance on precedent is universally a major part of the practice of 
constitutional lawyers and political scientists. However, in New Zealand, 
compared with other countries, our size, limited resources and close historical 
links with Britain have meant that we have nearly exclusively relied on 
overseas precedent and theorists. 110 We have not faced any sort of national 
crisis, without precedent elsewhere, which has required original thinking. 111 
The effect of this has been that there is a paucity of original New Zealand 
political and constitutional ideas. 
New Zealand's reliance on overseas precedents and theories has predominantly 
been confined to the British W est:minster system and the theories that underpin 
it. The constitutional situations and innovations of other countries with 
situations more similar to our own, such as smaller bi-cultural or multi-ethnic 
10s Democracy and Power: a Study of New Zealand Politics (2 ed) (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1989) 7 ["Democracy and Power'l See also Jack Vowles "Liberal Democracy: Pakeha 
Pohtical Ideology" (1987) 21 New Zealand Journal of History 215,216 ["Liberal Democracy"]. 
109 Democracy and Power above n 108, 7-8. 
no Democracy and Power above n 108, 7. 
111 "Liberal Democracy" above n 108, 216. 
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countries, have not been looked to.112 Also, theoretical models advocating 
consideration of different ethnic groups within constitutional arrangements 
such as Lijphart' s consensus model have not received adequate 
consideration.113 New Zealand's reliance on British precedent and theory has 
effectively meant that our unique situation in light of the Treaty and the 
relationship between Maori and Pakeha has been disregarded. 
Two other more specific reasons exist for the idea of a Maori legislative body 
not being seriously considered by academics. The first is that, of the few New 
Zealand constitutional lawyers and political scientists who actually specialise 
on the New Zealand system, even fewer look at Maori issues. 114 This is partly 
because of the idea that Maori issues are best dealt with by Maori, and 
particularly by Maori constitutional lawyers and political scientists of whom 
there are very few. 11 5 Thus as a whole, Maori, their political traditions and their 
theories have so far had little influence on political and constitutional academic 
work. 
The second reason is that some constitutional lawyers have not discussed 
constitutional institutional change as a way of incorporating the Treaty into our 
constitution because they have their own ideas on what should be being done. 
Geoffrey Palmer, for example, has stated that ideas of constitutional 
institutional change are a distraction "from the main business"116 which is "to 
make progress under the Treaty of W aitangi to ensure that Maori grievances 
are addressed and that justice is done." 117 He also has stated that the way any 
112 For example the constitutional arrangements or the bodies of indigenous people in the Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Samoa, Canada, Norway, Lebanon and Malta. 
113 Arend Lijphart, Democrades: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984). 
114 Interview with Stephen Levine, Head of the School of Political Science and International 
Relations, 31 March 1998 ["Stephen Levine"]. 
115 "Stephen Levine" above n 114. 
116 "Where to From Here?" above n 72, 242. 
117 "Where to From Here?" above n 72, 243. 
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constitutional change should occur is through the inclusion of the Treaty in a 
constitutional document which is higher law. 118 
IIX COULD IT BECOME AN ISSUE? 
Theoretically, the idea of a Maori legislative body could become an issue if 
there is a change in the above factors. 
One possible way a Maori legislative body could become an issue then would 
be if a constitutional crisis arose or if constitutional reconstruction was 
undertaken. Either of these situations would lead to Maori, Government and 
academics alike potentially having to evaluate the idea. 
An increase in Maori support could also force the idea to become an issue. 
Maori support could increase because of an injustice (as in the 1880s and 1990s 
where land grievances and the Crawn Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of 
Waitangi Claims respectively were the catalysts), as Maori look to wider issues 
again after the Treaty settlement process is completed.119 or if Maori 
representation and power in Parliament decreased again. 
Government consideration or discussion of the ideas could also lead to it 
becoming an issue. As well as being pressured into the idea due to Maori or 
public support for the idea, it is foreseeable that a government coalition partner 
could put the idea on the agenda for Government discussion. 
A rise in academic research, consideration and debate on the idea may also lead 
to it becoming an issue. Exploration of the idea by academics could raise the 
interest and/ or support of Maori and members of the public. Academic work 
ns "Where to From Here?" above n 72,244. 
119 See Georgina Te Heuheu's comment in "Maori Call for Republic Debate" above n 96 "The 
Treaty plays a role in our society that is much, much more than a mechanism for settling 
claims and correcting injustice. It is important we understand the settlement of historic claims 
is not an end, but rather a beginning" . 
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may also be able to dispel attitudes such as the "One Nation",
 "Too Hard" and 
"Not the Right Time" attitudes which have hindered the id
ea becoming an 
issue. The interest and support that could potentially be raise
d may even force 
the Government into considering the idea, especially if academ
ics criticised and 
removed the government's ability to rely on the argument of a
 Maori legislative 
body being against parliamentary sovereignty. In this way, academ
ics could 
have a vital role in making the idea of a Maori legislative body a
n issue. 
The importance of academic work can be seen in how chang
ing the electoral 
system from FPP to MMP became an issue. Although ther
e was a level of 
dissatisfaction about FPP, it was really the work of academic
s in highlighting 
FPP' s problems and exploring new options that led to chan
ge becoming an 
issue. 
The question that remains is: How can the interest of academ
ics be raised so 
that the idea of a Maori legislative body begins to be addres
sed? This essay 
seeks to be one attempt at trying to gain the interest of tho
se who have not 
considered this idea or perhaps dismissed it too lightly. In this way
, as stated 
initially, this essay seeks to be a challenge. 
IX FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The purpose of this essay has not been to construct a mo
del for a Maori 
legislative body which can be incorporated into ou
r constitutional 
arrangements. However, to avoid the common fault of past c
ommentators not 
proposing any actual ideas for a Maori legislative body, a su
ggestion is given 
below for a possible future direction for debate on this idea. 
It is suggested that the most feasible option for a Maori legislative bo
dy in New 
Zealand today would be a body along the lines of the Parema
ta Maori and the 
early proposals of King Tawhiao. It could be a single house with 
jurisdiction 
' 
' I 
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over specific areas of law relating to Maori and their rights under the Treaty. 
The existing national Parliament would continue to make general laws for the 
country. The Maori body could have varying powers with respect to different 
aspects of law within its area of concern. On some aspects the body could have 
equal legislative power to the national Parliament and so be subject only to the 
Governor General. On other aspects the body could be granted regulatory type 
powers under Acts of the national Parliament For example, the body could be 
responsible for the management and creation of regulations under the Maori 
Fisheries Acts. Regulations made by the body would probably be subject to 
normal restrictions upon regulations. Lastly, on other aspects the body would 
play an advisory role to the national Parliament. It could present a Maori 
position and Maori concerns on areas of general legislation. Maori 
representation in the national Parliament, despite this advisory function, would 
continue. No need is seen for the creation of a Senate. 
This proposal captures the relationship within the Treaty in a more accurate 
form than the Three House Model. Maori have a distinct measure of tino 
rangatiratanga over Maori areas as well as a say within the overall running of 
the country, while the national Parliament has a form of kawanatanga or 
general management 
This proposal fits well with the criteria under which the Three House Model 
was critiqued. The aim of this proposal though is not to provide a definitive 
description for a model but rather to provide a possible direction for thought. 
Some people will prefer other directions such as a Kauhanganui direction 
which would be in line with the worldwide trend among indigenous people, 
including Maori, to seek self-governance.120 Others, on consideration of this 
direction, may think it is unfeasible. What is important and intended here 
120 See Te Puni Kokiri Mana Tangata - Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1993: 
background issues and discussion on key issues (Te Puni Kokiri, Wellington, 1994). Also Mason 
Durie notes that by the third Hirangi Hui it was apparent that there was a shift from 
discussion on constitutional reform for New Zealand to the development of a constitution for a 
Maori nation see Te Mana above n 91, 235. 
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though, is not to find a permanent or sole direction for future debate but rather 
for debate to be stimulated. This is the challenge. 
X CONCLUSION 
The aim of this essay has been to stimulate interest, thought and debate on the 
idea of a Maori legislative body. A Maori legislative body is one way which 
the Treaty could be incorporated into our constitutional arrangements. 
Up until now, despite our ability to change our constitutional institutions and 
despite the development of designs for a Maori legislative body since the 1880s, 
the potential for a Maori legislative body has not been properly addressed. 
Instead we have preferred to stay closeted within our Westminster style 
institutions. 
Resounding through this essay has been the point that New Zealand has been 
uninterested and reluctant to discuss our constitution, its uniqueness and its 
future directions. This inertia and unquestioning attachment to our "inherited" 
constitutional arrangements is not only significant to the idea of a Maori 
legislative body but also with respect to other potential forms of constitutional 
change. 
The attitudes of groups, particular circumstances and academic limitations 
which, up until now, have hindered the idea of a Maori legislative body being 
seriously considered, no longer need to restrain us. Nor need we wait until 
circumstances or attitudes change before thought and debate begins. Rather, 
the examination and exploration of the idea may serve to change attitudes and 
kindle interest. 
Therefore, we need to begin to see our constitution not as an offshoot of the 
Westminster system and limited to its precedent and theories. Some guidance 
' for future constitutional directions could be sought from countries more similar to New Zealand. However, most of the ideas for change should emerge from 
original New Zealand thought 
It has been proposed that future discussions for the development of a Maori 
legislative body should follow the direction of the theories of the Paremata 
Maori and King Tawhiao's early proposals. This essay and this proposal stand 
as challenges for others to develop or criticise. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Model of the Three House Model taken from a transcript of a lecture 
given by W. Winiata at Massey Universitv, 14 March 1996 entitled 
"Prop~sal for Parlimentary Arrangements Under the Treaty of W aitangi". 
(copy m the possession of the Author) 
VOTING in Treaty ofWaitangi 
House: To be passed, motions 
will require a majority of the 
representatives of each Tikanga 
to be in favour. 
TIKANGA MAORI LEGISLATURE: 
PROPOSAL FOR PAHLIAMENTAllY AHHANGFMENTS 
UNl>Ell TIIE TIU:ATY OF WAITANC;J 
TREATY OF WAIT ANG I HOUSE 
A Two Tikanga Forum: 
Pakeha and Maori 
POSSinLE MEMBERSHIP: 
]I rt:preuntlng t/kanga 
Paluha; I I for tlkanga 
Maori 
LOCATION: Pos!lbly Wa/tangl 
Proposals for legislation 
JOB: To produce legislation. 
Would operate within tikangn Maori 
- own electoral system (to accommodate hapu, ~=----------.L...---------~ 
iwi, waka, pan-Maori, morae-based and those 
separated from marae) 
-would probably avoid party politics 
MEMBERS/I IP: r,mlhly ]5 
LOCATION: Passlhly Tura11,:I 
JOD of Treaty of Waitangi 
House: To 
(a) receive proposals for 
legislation from the houses 
shown below, separately or 
jointly. 
(b) test those proposals 
against the 
- Treaty ofWaitangi and 
- rules for consultation 
between the other two 
Houses and 
(c) if both tests arc met, 
pass the proposals into 
legislation or 
(d) if not, return them to either 
or both houses for further work. 
TIKANGA PAKEHA LEGISLATIVE: 
JOB: To produce legislation. 
Would operate within tiknngn Pokcha 
- own electoral system; probably MMP 
- would probably retain party politics 
MEMBERSHIP: Possibly 75 
LOCATION: Probably Wdlin,:ton 
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